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Since the turn of the 21st century, a distinctive Chinese variety of industrial 
capitalism has taken shape. In this chapter, we trace the contours of China's 
emergent industrial economy, giving special attention to the role of the 
information technology (IT) industry. Throughout China's reform era, the 
IT industry has often been a forerunner of broader trends in the industrial 
economy, and this continues to be true today. For most of the socialist 
period, development was equated with large, heavy industrial plants. Even 
under market transition, the Chinese government at first maintained its 
faith in guided development and invested resources in large, state-owned 
firms in the hope of creating "national champions." 
However, over the past decade planners have moved away from the 
"big-is-better" model of industrialization, and instead placed their hopes 
in science and technology-intensive industry. This focus has recently been 
formalized in the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), with its emphasis on 
human resources, technology development, and a scientific approach to 
development (Naughton 2005b). The IT industry has thus stepped into the 
starring role in a long-running drama, that of China's transformation into 
an industrial economy. We use the IT industry as a wedge to gain entry into 
the industrial economy as a whole, and to provide insights into the broader 
development of China's industrial capitalism. 
At the same time, we are not just interested in the context of IT industry 
development: we are interested in the changes in business strategy and 
the building of technological capabilities that are taking place within the 
IT industry. China's industrial economy is already so large and so diverse 
that it is difficult to make meaningful statements that apply to its entirety. 
. . Ekmmmg strategy and capabilities - especially innovative capabilities - gives 
us a crucial benchmark to assess how real the changes in the IT industry 
have been. What alternative strategies are emerging in China to the now 
discredited "big-is-better" model? Will China become a leading world tech- 
nology power? Or will limitations in its economic and innovation system 
prevent China from moving beyond its current status of a low-cost export- 
manufacturing platform? In this sense, we assess China's IT industry as an 
exemplar of China's overall industrial transformation. 
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From the perspective of the IT sector, we see a fairly successful transition 
toward a capitalist market ewnomy for China. In the overall industrial 
economy state ownership is still significant, but it is now concentrated 
primarily in natural resource sectors and utilities. State-owned firms, 
while present, play a secondary role in the IT sector, where technical innov- 
ation is critical. In fact, China has muddled through to a highly flexible. 
internationally open, and entrepreneurial solution in sectors such as IT 
hardware and software. 
We therefore disagree with the findings of a pessimistic literature that 
provides a backward-looking appraisal of weaknesses in China's industrial 
economy (e.g. Gilboy 2004; Nolan 2002; Rosen 2003; Steinfeld 2004). Rather. 
we argue that the IT industry has played a crucial role both in transform- 
ing China's industrial economy and in forging a peculiar Chinese model 
of developing a vibrant high-tech industry. A hybrid mixture of ownership 
and corporate governance patterns has been combined with aggressive pol- 
icies to foster alliances with global leaders in industry and research. This 
has enabled Chinese IT firms to accelerate the development of management 
and innovation capabilities. 
The first section of this chapter describes how China's contemporary 
industrial economy emerged from the state-run economy and introduces our 
first illustrative case of a Chinese IT company, the computer firm Legend 
Lenovo. The next section describes the emergence of a broader three-tiered 
industrial system, and indicates where Chinese IT companies fit in. The 
third section highlights new opportunities and challenges for Chinese IT 
firms that result from their progressive integration into global production 
and innovation networks. The fourth section introduces Huawei, China's 
largest telecommunications and networking equipment manufacturer, our 
second illustrative case. We examine Huawei's business model and show 
how the company is seeking to exploit the new international division of 
labor to foster managerial and innovative capabilities. 
Prelude: the IT industry's role in creating a market-driven 
industrial economy 
China's contemporary industrial economy emerged from the state-run economy 
through a process of gradualist transition and incremental marketization. 
Early on, hundreds of thousands of small labor-intensive township and village 
enterprises (TVEs) sprang up under the auspices of local governments. Yet for 
a long time, Chinese policy-makers also hoped to improve the performance of 
existing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and build up large, state-run indus- 
trial corporations as "national champions." Chinese planners expected that 
state-owned firms would be the main force driving the development of more 
capital-intensive and technologically sophisticated industry. 
Consequently, state firms and foreign investors were forced into what 
were essentially shotgun mamages, with planners serving as match-makers. 
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This policy was a recipe for lobbying and rent-seeking by existing large 
state firms, and absorbed an enormous amount of resources. By the mid- 
1990s, the policy was already in crisis due to its perceived lack of effective- 
ness (Naughton and Segal 2002). The program suffered a further blow to 
its underlying rationale when, with the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998, 
many of the Korean chaebols that were a source of inspiration for the 
program ran into serious trouble. It became apparent to Chinese policy- 
makers, as to Korean policy-makers, that a fundamental restructuring of 
the biggest firms would be required. 
In this environment, the IT industry provided an attractive alternate 
model. Many of China's early IT successes were so-called minban (civilian) 
firms. These were firms with lineages in the state sector - and often nom- 
inal state ownership. However, these firms had grown up independent of 
the state industrial hierarchy and enjoyed operational autonomy under 
the direction of high technology entrepreneurs. Beginning in the 1980s. 
Chinese policy-makers allowed these firms unusual freedom and flexibility 
for three reasons: they had observed that small, entrepreneurial start-up 
firms played a key role in the US'S technological resurgence in the 1980s 
and 1990s (the Silicon Valley model); the new firms were started by indi- 
viduals with unusually impressive skills and especially good contacts with 
state research organizations; and finally, policy-makers had few, if any, 
real alternatives, since none of the large state-owned IT companies offered 
much promise. 
All of these factors were exemplified by the success of a single firm, 
Legend Computer, later known as Lenovo (Emst U)(Mb, Ling 2005; Lu 2000; 
Xie and White 2004). A start-up in the 1980s, it was a spin-off of the 
Institute of Computer Science in the elite Chinese Academy of Sciences. 
An impressive number of such firms sprang up in Zhongguancun, the high- 
tech neighborhood and later development zone in the northwest of Beijing 
(near the elite Peking and Tsinghua Universities). 
In 1998, Legend became a pioneer in another sense - it became what is 
arguably the first government-sanctioned management buy-out (MBO) of 
a state firm. Technically, Legend was an SOE, "owned" by the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences. which provided the initial personnel and modest 
financing for its creation. Along with other SOEs after the mid-1990s, 
Legend was to be "corporatized," which involved explicitly demarcating the 
corporation's formerly vague and ambiguous ownership stakes. 
At this point, Legend's managerial group was essentially the same as its 
founding group. That this management would gain a substantial stake in 
Legend was completely defensible: they had created the firm from scratch, 
and they clearly deserved to reap some of the rewards from their entrepre- 
neurial vision. The managerial group initially proposed that a 38 percent 
stake of the company be distributed to them, but this ran into an existing 
government policy that no more than 20 percent of the ownership of an 
SOE should be distributed to existing employees. After intense negotiations, 
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~ e ~ e n d  employees were allowed to purchase, on highly favorable terms, 
30 percent of the company. This compromise enabled the Chinese govern- 
ment to nominally hold on to its existing policy and retain the Academy of 
Sciences as (passive) majority owner, but give effective control to Legend's 
founders and managers. 
Legend became an important precedent. In subsequent years, MBOs 
became a powerful channel for the transformation of China's industrial 
structure. Indeed, for TVEs, management buy-outs, or insider privatiza- 
t ion~, had already emerged as an important trend during the 1990s. The 
Legend restructuring signaled that such procedures could be acceptable 
in the state sector as well. By the early 2000s, MBOs had become the 
predominant form of transformation for TVEs and an extremely important - 
and controversial - mechanism for transforming SOEs as well (Naughton 
2005a; Naughton 2007: 286-292,319-325). 
As MBOs gained in legitimacy, privatization became an important force 
reshaping the Chinese industrial economy. China's industrial system thus 
went through a profound transformation during the early 2000s. At the top 
of the industrial hierarchy the central government retained the largest, most 
important state-owned firms. Meanwhile, at the bottom of the industrial 
hierarchy, the majority of TVEs and many small SOEs were converted to 
private ownership. Today's industrial economy therefore emerged from 
the uneven way in which privatization and restructuring were allowed 
to spread, forming three distinct tiers of corporations that characterize 
China's present-day industrial capitalism. 
China's emerging industrial economy: a three-tier structure 
Tier one 
The first tier consists of large, central government controlled firms, which 
are primarily in sectors with some degree of natural monopoly or market 
power. In 2002, control of these firms was consolidated in a new body, 
the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC). Initially, SASAC assumed responsibility for 196 firms, a number 
that was reduced through merger and consolidation to 159 by the end of 
2006 (SASAC 2007). Among this number, there are less than 100 industrial 
corporations. However, many of the corporations are huge, and one corpor- 
ation may possess many dozens of subordinate industrial enterprises. 
At first glance, this tier of large, centrally controlled firms might appear 
to exemplify the old "big-is-better" model of industrial organization, but 
in fact there are considerable differences. The sectoral structure of the cen- 
trally controlled firms does not replicate the extremely diversified structure 
of Korean chaebols, or Japanese keiretsu. Nearly all the firms in the cen- 
tral "portfolio" have a clear business focus on one or two sectors, often in 
natural resources. Moreover, these firms have been subject to an ongoing 
process of restructuring that is frequently designed to get them to focus 
on "core competencies." that is, on specific sectors in which they have a 
sustainable competitive advantage. 
SASAC's mission is to carry out the state's role as owner in the industrial 
economy. The head of SASAC, Li Rongrong, has repeatedly made it clear 
that he sees SASAC's mission as increasing the value of government assets. 
While the central government will share ownership stakes with strategic 
investors and the public by floating some of the companies on stock 
markets, the government intends to maintain substantial control. 
Ironically, SASAC's interpretation of its mandate has increasingly 
followed a well-known business school logic: focus on core competencies, 
spin off noncore businesses. Thus, SASAC has adopted the mantra - first 
mooted by General Electric - that a company should be number one, two, 
or three in its business. Otherwise, it should get out. The key slogan, then, 
is "focus," not "big-is-better." 
In addition, most of the centrally controlled firms are in sectors where 
there is a degree of market power. They control the key natural resource, 
telecom, and trading companies. In 2006, central SASAC's firms produced 
profit and turned over taxes equaling an enormous 6.8 percent of GDP, 
evidence of their market power (SASAC 2007). In fact, SASAC's newly 
important role increases an emphasis on maximizing monopoly rents. 
Every capitalist would like to have a monopoly position: SASAC is no dif- 
ferent. Because SASAC's role is to represent the government as owner, it 
naturally stresses financial returns and puts less emphasis on economic 
growth, economic reform, and fair competition (roles performed by gov- 
ernment regulatory agencies and the National Development and Reform 
Commission). 
The large central government firms that are most important to the IT 
industry are the telecom operators. As of 2006, four large telecom firms are 
subordinate to the central government. Three of these were spun off from 
the old government monopoly service provider: China Telecom (fmed line); 
China Mobile; and China Netcom (a combine of fmed line and internet 
backbone services). A new entrant, China Unicom, with a totally diffkrent - but 
still state-owned - background was allowed to provide competing mobile 
services. All of these firms are predominantly state-owned, and SASAC 
now "owns" all four. As a result, SASAC seeks to moderate competition 
among them in order to create a viable combination of healthy firms, tacit 
collaboration, and high profits. 
This objective was particularly in evidence in October 2004 when SASAC 
shuffled the management of the top three telecom firms, replacing the 
top manager in each firm with the second or third-rank manager from a 
competing firm. The message was clear: don't compete too aggressively, 
for the company you compete with could one day be your own. SASAC's 
intervention is ongoing: throughout 2005 and 2006, SASAC struggled with 
different proposals to reorganize the telecom industry, looking for ways to 
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shuffle activities and licenses among operators in order to create stronger, 
competitive companies that will adopt advanced "third generation" (3G) 
telecommunications technology. 
While SASAC has obviously been looking for ways to support a domestic- 
ally grown 3G telecom standard (known as TD-SCDMA), it has had trouble 
finding an effective policy in this market environment. All of the existing 
telecom firms would like to move into 3G mobile telephony, but none of them 
wants to be saddled with the unproven domestic standard. In all four cases, the 
telecom companies have complex corporate structures with minority share- 
holders inside and outside China, so SASAC is not able to simply redistribute 
assets (and licenses) among the groups as it could have in the old days. 
The dynamics of the telecom industry are very important for China's IT 
hardware industry, because the service providers are big customers. Choices 
about technological standards, domestic preferences, and business rules 
shape the options of the hardware industry. Precisely because the service 
providers have some market power, they have rich margins that allow them 
to pay higher costs to support fledgling companies and new initiatives. 
The telecom firms are not themselves likely to be the cutting edge firms of 
China's technological future, but they will provide opportunities for other 
companies that may play dynamic roles. 
Several IT hardware companies do show up in SASAC's portfolio, and 
each has a unique history in the state sector. The first, China Electronics 
Technology Corporation (CETC), is a grab-bag of forty six research insti- 
tutes, part of the military industrial complex, but with a number of subor- 
dinate profit-making companies as well.' The second, China Electronics 
Corporation (CEC), descended from the firms controlled by the Ministry 
of Electronics and today groups together sixteen wholly owned subsidiaries 
and thirty controlled companies. The third, Putian, groups together the 
telecommunications equipment factories that used to be subordinate to the 
Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. 
Some of the firms subordinate to these three big groups have signifi- 
cant independent capabilities. However, each of these groups is in fact a 
fairly troubled jumble of companies. The subordinate companies of each 
seek to establish themselves independently, a feasible objective since own- 
ership of the companies is often shared among state and nonstate groups. 
Meanwhile, the groups themselves are subject to continuous reorganization. 
For instance, one formerly independent fum, Great Wall Computer (best 
known for its joint venture with IBM) was merged into CEC on August 1, 
2005 (SASAC 2005). 
Two other IT hardware firms show up in SASAC's portfolio. One is a joint 
venture in Shanghai with Aicatel, "centrally controlled" by historical acci- 
dent: this is arguably the only successful example of a planner-orchestrated 
partnership involving foreign multinationals (Mu and Lee 2005; Shen 1999). 
The final IT firm, IRICO, is a color picture-tube producer near Xi'an, 
legacy of an earlier stage of China's development. 
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It is most striking what we do not observe in this portfolio of central 
government IT firms. Unlike the robust, wealthy, and centrally managed 
large firms in the natural resources, energy, and public utility fields, we do 
not find in this portfolio a single potential "national champion." SASAC's 
IT firms are unstable groupings with wildly varying capabilities. With a few 
exceptions, the most dynamic hardware and software companies are not 
under SASAC, but rather in China's second tier of companies. 
Tier two 
Tbe second tier of industrial firms is made up of medium-sized firms oper- 
ating in competitive markets. Second-tier firms have diverse origins: they 
may come from the state sector, from foreign investment, or, increasingly, 
may be domestic Chinese start-ups. Firms that originated in the state sector 
were usually local government-controlled. Since they were rarely in mon- 
opoly sectors, they were exposed to competition and less profitable than 
central government firms. No strategic rationale thus existed for public 
ownership and local governments were quite willing to privatize or close 
down these firms (Li and Lui 2004). As noted above, MBOs have been 
permitted after 2000 in small- and medium-sized state firms. These firms 
are now rapidly restructuring and privatizing, creating one of the seedbeds 
of the new production forces and new interest groups shaping China's 
emergent capitalism. 
As a result of the new flexibility about ownership, hybrid firms are 
rapidly being created. These firms take on a variety of organizational 
forms, particularly in the IT sector. There is no single hybrid pattern, but 
we can identify three characteristics that are often present. First, there is 
often a dominant manager or managerial group, usually with a significant 
ownership stake. These firms move quickly because they have personalized 
decisive leadership; they are not yet bureaucratized companies. 
Second, ownership is divided. These firms are usually not 100 percent 
privately owned. Local governments often hold minority stakes, either dir- 
ectly, or through intermediaries. When these rums are listed on the stock 
markets, a minority of shares is typically sold. Companies from Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, and overseas often hold stakes as well. Shared ownership 
seems to be commonly used to align interests between entrepreneurs and 
other stakeholders, including local government. 
Third, many of these firms are linked to overseas actors through global 
production and innovation networks. Multiple forms of integration, such 
as contract manufacturing (in both directions), research partnerships, 
licensing, equity stakes, and many other means connect domestic with 
foreign firms (Ernst 2007). 
This is the most dynamic part of Chinese industry today. Released from 
state control, powerful local interest groups are supporting the emergence of 
new companies, frequently in collaboration with foreign firms. With China's 
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booming economy and its large pool of knowledge workers providing ample 
opportunities, this segment of industry is undergoing explosive growth and 
defining the future of Chinese capitalism. Flexibility is the byword, and 
I 
in many cases it is simply no longer possible to classify firms into the old 
categories of state-owned, collective, private, or foreign-invested. Some 
industrial sectors straddle the first and second tiers: for example, steel and 
automobiles. Large state-owned companies still dominate, but rapidly 
growing hybrid, mostly private firms with local government backing, are 1 
emerging to challenge the leaders. 
The steel industry is a good example. State control in this capital-intensive 
industry was traditionally reinforced by the state's privileged access to 
financing. But today private firms are growing explosively, especially in 
Hebei, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang. It is still not entirely clear whether the central 
government will allow genuine competition between its firms and newly 
entering private steel companies. In July 2005, the central government 
promulgated an official industrial policy for the steel industry (National 
Development and Reform Commission 2005) that clearly intends to shore 
up the state's position. Foreign companies were forbidden to purchase 
controlling stakes, but domestic private interests were not. A guess 
based on China's past trajectory would say that sectors such as steel and 
automobiles - unlike oil, electricity, and telecom - will within five to ten 
years be dominated by large hybrid businesses, and fall clearly within the 
second tier of Chinese industrial firms. 
China's IT industry is predominantly in the second tier, since the most 
important and most dynamic firms are hybrid firms. As we argue in more 
detail below, the global IT industry is being transformed by an increasing 
vertical specialization of production - "modularity" of organization is 
extended across all stages of the value chain, including research and product 
development. To adjust to the resultant rapid changes in technology and 
markets, Chinese IT firms require robust innovation and management 
capabilities and a high degree of flexibility. 
LegendILenovo Computer demonstrates the importance of strategic 
flexibility. The company started out primarily as a reseller of foreign com- 
puters, and gradually moved into assembly. Its founder espoused a model 
he dubbed "mao-gong-ji," or moving from trade, through manufacturing, 
to technology &velopment. Contrary to much that has been written, Lenovo 
never really developed into a manufacturing powerhouse. Instead, it d e d -  
oped a strong domestic brand and good design, distribution, and supply 
networks. For example, in 2003, Lenovo outsourced 100 percent of its 
laptops and 40 percent of its motherboards to Taiwan contract manufac- 
turers, thus turning the "international subcontracting" model on its head 
(Jiang 2004). 
Lenovo's subsequent, highly publicized acquisition of IBM's personal 
computer division built on this foundation to create the ultimate hybrid 
firm. As part of its acquisition of IBM in late 2004, Lenovo received a 
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US$350 million private equity commitment from Texas Pacific Group, 
General Atlantic, and Newbridge. These new investors have reduced IBM's 
share in Lenovo to 13.4 percent and hold around 12.4 percent of Lenovo's 
capital. As a result, private equity investors are now involved in much of 
Lenovo's decision-making (Emst 2007). 
Lenovo's headquarters moved to the US, and the company announced 
it would adopt English as its official language. In fact, the company hired 
an American, Bill Amelio, as CEO, an executive who had previously been 
in charge of Dell Computer's Asia operations. By this choice, Lenovo 
showed that it believed the ability to manage complex multinational supply 
networks would be the critical success factor. 
Therefore, in the course of its multiple transformations, Lenovo has 
come to exemplify the "hybrid ownership" that is so distinctive a feature of 
China's second tier of industry. Like Lenovo, most of the leading Chinese 
IT firms - Hai'er, TCL, Founder, Huawei, ZTE, Datang, and SMIC - can 
be accurately characterized as hybrid firms with substantial public and 
private ownership stakes. 
Tier three 
The small-scale sector, which forms the third tier, has undergone important 
changes as well. TVEs have themselves become almost entirely privatized; 
and their ties with local communities have weakened. The resulting small- 
scale sector has much more flexible labor markets, and a strong tendency 
towards industrial clusters and flexible specialization. These industrial 
clusters - often characterized by hundreds of small firms competing and 
collaborating - have grown up to serve export markets in sectors of both 
high and low technology. The town of Zhuji, in Zhejiang, produces 35 percent 
of world sock output - 8 billion pairs a year - almost entirely from small- 
and medium-sized enterprises. Another Zhejiang town has hundreds of 
small electric hand tool component producers and assemblers (Qian 2003; 
Ross 2004). Thus, openness and flexible specialization is an increasingly 
important characteristic of China's small-scale sector. 
The bulk of the third tier is in relatively low technology, labor-intensive 
production, but the dividing line between primitive and sophisticated 
technology is not as clear as it once was. It is no longer the case that small- 
scale necessarily means low-technology, primitive, backward family fms 
Relatively sophisticated industrial sectors now include clusters of small 
high-tech firms, often linked by subcontracting networks. These can be 
alternatives to larger firms. When flexible specialization and high tech- 
nology come together, the result is a cluster like the one around Dongguan, 
in Guangdong's Pearl River Delta. More than 95 percent of the components 
of a desktop computer are produced within a 50-mile radius of Dongguan. 
Most of this production is from foreign-invested firms, but small-scale 
firms play important roles as suppliers (Huang 2002). 
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The transformation of the small-scale sector now extends beyond 
manufacturing, and includes product development and some aspects of 
applied research. Good examples are Celestial Semiconductor, a start-up 
company in the Shangdi Information Industrial Base in Beijing's Haidian 
District that specializes in mixed-signal chip design, as well as Tech-Faith, 
a firm that recently listed on NASDAQ and specializes in the design of 
mobile phones. Both are cases of dividing the value chain into increasingly 
narrow slices that now also include innovation (Ernst 2006a, 2006b). 
Opportunities and challenges for Chinese IT firms 
Why is flexibility and international openness so important for China's 
development trajectory? China's opportunities to develop its IT industry 
differ from those faced earlier by Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. China 
has a unique combination of competitive advantages that shape the context 
in which its IT industry develops. First and foremost, China has a huge 
and booming market for electronics products and services. Second, China 
has the world's largest pool of low-cost specialized and easily retrainable 
labor. Third, deriving from the two previous factors, China has recently 
seen the emergence of sophisticated lead users and test-bed markets, giving 
it new opportunities in the area of innovation. Finally, Chinese policymakers 
can learn from the past achievements and mistakes of their East Asian 
predecessors to adjust national and local policies. 
At the same time, the global environment within which China seeks to 
develop is dramatically different from that of previous East Asian success 
stories. Most importantly, China's technological development over the past 
twenty years has been inseparable from the expansion of global production 
networks (GPNs) and the relocation of most production stages, including 
engineering and R&D. China is far more integrated into these networks 
than were Japan and South Korea earlier. 
Incoming foreign direct investment has averaged over 4 percent of 
GDP in China over the past decade, during Japan and South Korea's high 
growth period, incoming foreign direct investment was never as much as 
0.5 percent of GDP. It is thus about ten times as important in China as in 
these earlier developers, and nowhere more so than in high technology 
exporting. In 2005, foreign-invested enterprises produced 58 percent of 
China's total exports, but fully 88 percent of high-technology exports 
(Ministry of Commerce 2006). As a result, China's emerging industrial 
economy in the IT industry cannot be meaningfully assessed except in the 
context of the GPNs into which Chinese firms are increasingly integrated. 
The ability of Chinese manufacturers to participate in GPNs provides 
valuable opportunities, but also creates new challenges. GPNs are usually 
organized by global "flagship" firms, who seek to structure them in their 
own economic interest (Emst 2002). They have an important element 
of hierarchy: flagship firms serve as overall architects, and they prefer 
to define platforms and maintain strategic control to reap rents, while 
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outsourcing as much low cost activity as possible to China. These incentives 
are at work both in production networks and in innovation networks. 
The trend of "innovation offshoring" (Ernst 2006a) has given rise to 
global innovation networks (GINs) that global corporations are gradually 
grafting onto their existing GPNs. Both GINS and GPNs are complex and 
multilayered "networks of networks" that involve both global corporations 
and "local" companies, that is, East Asian companies that are focused pri- 
marily on the region. GINS share two defining characteristics with GPNs: 
asymmetry, because flagships dominate control over network resources 
and decision-making; and knowledge diffusion, because the sharing of 
knowledge is the necessary glue that keeps these networks growing. In fact, 
the hierarchical nature of flagship-dominated networks appears to facili- 
tate knowledge exchange (Ernst and Kim 2002), and hence provides new 
opportunities for Chinese IT firms. 
Practically all global IT industry leaders, as well as a growing number 
of second-tier firms, have begun to conduct RLD in China. Increasingly, 
the focus is shifting from the adjustment of existing technologies to the 
development of new products and processes dedicated to the Asian market 
(Armbrecht 2003). In addition, China's "brain drain" has produced trans- 
national skilled migrant communities that can act as highly effective carriers 
of tacit knowledge about global market and technology trends. 
On balance, these global transformations create substantial new opportun- 
ities for Chinese IT firms. The cost advantages of China's deep and relatively 
sophisticated manpower base are well documented (e.g. Banister 2005). Less 
fully recognized has been the extent to which the Chinese market, in addition 
to its sheer size, provides many of the advantages of a lead market (Beise 2004). 
In addition, China's deep integration into GPNs and GINs arguably facilitates 
knowledge diffusion and exports. The most significant strategies will therefore 
be those that allow firms to benefit from China's unique combination of com- 
petitive advantages: low labor costs for unskilled and some highly skilled work- 
ers; large and growing markets for IT products and services; and "opennessn to 
international trade, investment, and technology (Liu 2005). 
Pessimistic analysts of Chinese capabilities focus on the limited roles 
Chinese firms have initially played within GPNs. They argue that integra- 
tion into GPNs will lead, at most, to gradual improvements of operational 
and manufacturing capabilities, leaving Chinese firms stuck at the bottom 
of innovative capabilities. This misses the driving force of creative oppor- 
tunism which leads Chinese firms to focus on cheaper, simpler products 
tailored to the Chinese market. These can be profoundly "disruptiven even 
though initially not seeming to be technologically impressive. 
To establish what options are realistic, we draw on two analytic tools: a 
well-known taxonomy of innovation (see Table 3.1) that distinguishes "incre- 
mental," "modular," "architectural," and "radical" innovations (Henderson 
and Clark 1990); and the concept of "disruptive technologies" (Christensen 
1997). "Incremental" innovations take both the dominant component 
design and architecture for granted, but improve on cost, time-to-market, 
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Table 3.1 Typology of innovations 
an@ arctiitectud i I radical 1 
I 
Architecture I 1 1 
Components 
I 
Source: Adapted from Henderson and Clark (1990). 
1 
and performance. With "modular" innovation, new component technology 
is plugged into a system architecture that is fundamentally unchanged. 
This type of innovation has been a defining characteristic of the personal 
computer industry; for instance, the multifunctional USB port on the 
personal computer exemplifies modular innovation. 
"Architectural" innovations change the way components are designed to 
work together, but use existing component technology that is available on 
the market to implement new designs. Architectural innovations thus intro- 
duce substantially new and distinct features to  existing system architectures. 
They also build on a company's familiarity with market demands, as with 
the development of Chinese-language electronics publishing systems by the 
Founder Group Company, a spin-off from Peking University (Lu 2000). 
Finally, "radical" innovations involve both the use of new component 
technology and changes in architectural design. They typically involve 
breakthroughs in both areas, such as the invention of the Internet. These 
innovations receive the greatest attention, and high margins through 
premium pricing and strong market entry deterrents. However, radical 
innovations require an extremely broad base of capabilities, and involve I 
huge risks. They are beyond the reach of most IT companies in China. 
(2hrktensen (1993) argues that established, vertically integmted market lead- 
ers typically lead in the adoption of new component technology, while s u c d l  
new entrants rely on architectural innovations. Technological complexity, and 1 
hence risk and cost, are lower for architectural innovations than for the develop- 
ment of new components, and afrchitectural innovations lead more immediately 
to increased sales and proftability. Christensen's (1997) concept of "disruptive 
technologies" deepens our understanding of these market factors. 
Disruptive technologies bring to market very different products: they 
I 
have features that initially only few new customers value. Products based 
I 
I 
unchanged changed 
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on disruptive technologies are typically cheaper, simpler, smaller, and, 
frequently, more convenient to use. Incumbent firms, especially market 
leaders, generally fail to notice "lower-end" markets that may erode their 
market leadership. That is because they promise lower margins, their most 
profitable customers generally do not want products based on disruptive 
technologies, and the required break from routine requires a different 
organization from sustaining technologies. Most importantly, developing 
disruptive technologies requires an organization of innovation with 
substantially lower overheads. 
Chinese IT firms are more likely to produce important innovations that 
are architectural or incremental, rather than modular or radical. The ability 
of Chinese IT firms to profit from architectural innovation may seem 
counter-intuitive, but it follows from their growing integration into GPNs 
and GINS, and their familiarity with peculiar features of Chinese markets. 
Chinese firms face relatively low entry barriers for "disruptive" technolo- 
gies, while they can leverage participation in GPNs and GINS to buy in 
widely available existing component technology. Chinese IT firms thus will 
often pursue architectural innovations leading to disruptive technologies. 
There is also scope for substantial incremental innovation by Chinese IT 
firms. To stay in the GPNs, Chinese f m s  must improve on cost, time-to- 
market, and performance. Intensifying price competition, especially in the 
China market, implies that Chinese firms are under tremendous pressure 
to exploit such incremental innovations across all stages of the value chain. 
These small incremental innovations gradually add up and may in time 
shift the rules of global production and innovation activities (Ernst 2007). 
By contrast, the focus in much of the current literature on China's tech- 
nology effort has been on Chinese government attempts to create national 
champions and mandate technical standards (Linden 2004; Suttmeier and 
Yao 2004). The Chinese government focuses on core "strategic" technolo- 
gies ("radical" in the terminology we have used here), while its policies are 
interventionist, certainly more so than India's. China's ambitious govern- 
ment efforts have caused worries that Chinese firms could successfully 
create "radical" innovations (US-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission 2005), while the extremely modest rate of success feeds the 
technological pessimism described above. 
We argue that these areas are simply not likely to  be where the action is. 
Innovative firms trolling through the global knowledge base and oppor- 
tunistically creating new architectural solutions to new market demands 
are the more likely seedbeds of technological breakthroughs. As for the 
Chinese government, it has overall done a reasonably good job of not 
intervening too much in firm decision-making, while providing a degree of 
unconditional resource support. It has displayed a healthy respect for the 
accumulated knowledge base possessed by global corporations, and policy 
makers have in recent years primarily focused on moving up the value chain 
within the context of GPN's. 
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Chinese lT firms responding - the case of Huawei 
Incorporated in 1988 and based in Shenzhen, Huawei is China's largest 
telecommunications and networking equipment manufact~rer.~ Huawei 
has experienced rapid growth of sales and profits, registering 25 percent 
annual sales growth since 1998. The company is also a telling example 
of the hybrid mixture of ownership and corporate governance that is a 
defining characteristic of China's second-tier industrial companies. In legal 
terms, Huawei is a "private" company, but it is not listed on any major 
stock exchange, and hence is not included in the Fortune list of "China's 100 
Largest Companies." 
The real driving force is Ren Zengfei, a People's Liberation Army veteran, 
who founded the company and who, as the company's president and CEO, 
exerts strong and idiosyncratic managerial influence throughout the 
organization. The company has a reputation for secretiveness, somewhat 
murky corporate governance, and top-down management by command 
and extensive micro-management. Employees hold the majority of Huawei 
"inner" shares, which arguably reflects the critical role the company has 
assigned to its highly skilled workforce - 90 percent of its 30,000 employees 
worldwide hold bachelor's degrees or higher. 
Within a few years, Huawei has been able to establish itself as a serious 
new competitor in the telecommunications industry. The company's suc- 
cess owes much to its focus on being a "low-cost cloner," seeking to price its 
products 30 percent lower than global market leaders. In addition, Huawei 
offers very aggressive sales incentives and exhaustive after-sales services, 
and it has a good reputation in customizing system engineering to specific 
requirements of customers who require "no-frill" systems. This business 
model was well in line with Huawei's initial strategic focus - to penetrate 
the Chinese market as well as secondary overseas markets in developing 
Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. 
However, the company is now seeking to expand its geographical 
presence and to upgrade its product line. It is forced to do so in order to 
counter aggressive attacks by its main global competitors, who are gaining 
market share in China.3 Huawei's aggressive plans for overseas expansion 
project a fivefold increase in international sales from US2.28 billion in 
2004 to around US$lO billion by 2008. In order to achieve this ambitious 
goal, the initial focus on secondary markets in developing and transition 
economies now needs to give way to a substantial expansion in the critical 
markets of the US, Europe, and Japan. Some initial success stories have 
been widely quoted in the press. These include British Telecom's decision 
to include Huawei in its list of eight preferred suppliers for the overhaul of 
its UK fixed-line phone network; and the decision by Telfort, the Dutch 
mobile operator, to contract Huawei to build its 3G mobile phone net- 
work. In fact, Telfort passed up an offer from Ericsson, its main supplier 
since 1998. 
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This is just the beginning of a very long road. To penetrate the world's 
most sophisticated markets, Huawei now seeks to transform itself from 
a "low-cost cloner" to a provider of integrated and customized network 
solutions and services. While fixed-line networks of telecommunications 
equipment still provide the bulk of revenues, mobile and optical networks 
are providing the fastest revenue growth. In addition, the company has 
committed substantial resources to develop value-added communication 
services and mobile handsets, especially for 3G mobile communication 
systems. Huawei has continuously invested more than 10 percent of its rev- 
enues in R&D. According to the company website (July 29,2005), Huawei 
has applied for 6,500 patents, and been granted 1,400 already. After ini- 
tially earning a bad reputation on intellectual property rights infringement 
(Einhorn 2004), the company now claims to follow a strategy of stringent 
protection. 
The focus of Huawei's innovation efforts is on a judicious combination of 
incremental and architectural innovations that provide integrated solutions 
throughout the life cycle of communications systems. In terms of incre- 
mental innovations, Huawei has made a conscious effort to improve on cost, 
time-to-market, and performance across its product range. This includes, for 
instance, substantial improvements in the management of product develop- 
ment, quality control, supply chains, and customer relations. 
Building on the company's familiarity with market trends and user 
requirements of operators in developing countries, Huawei has also pursued 
architectural innovations. It has developed equipment and solution pack- 
ages that, while under-performing relative to established products in main- 
stream markets, satisfy the essential needs of operators at much lower cost. 
An example is "Tel@com," Huawei's patented approach to the alignment 
of existing fixed networks that allows operators with limited budgets to 
adjust quickly to and exploit the rapid development of IP (internet protocol) 
telephony and broadband technologies. Another example is a distributed 
3G base station that needs no special equipment room, thus dispensing with 
costly rental, and which has only two thirds of the average power consump- 
tion of similar products in the industry. 
Such strategies may now be increasingly effective in the leading telecom- 
munications markets of industrialized countries. After the bursting of the 
telecommunications bubble in 2000, and the resultant turmoil and wealth 
destruction, leading telecom operators are much less willing than before to 
buy the overengineered and very expensive equipment. systems, and ser- 
vices that are on offer from global industry leaders. In short, the overriding 
objective of Huawei's strategy to upgrade its product portfolio is to provide 
"integrated communication and network solutions . . . in order to consist- 
ently create maximum value for customers," especially those with limited 
budgets (Huawei Annual Report 2004: 11). 
Huawei exemplifies an important characteristic of Chinese IT companies 
by forging collaborative agreements and alliances with global industry 
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leaders and universities. Huawei, for instance, relied heavily on IBM's 
consulting arm to develop sophisticated "integrated product development" 
techniques, and foster Huawei's "integrated supply chain" management. 
Through its software development affiliate in Bangalore (India), Huawei 
became familiar with the huge efficiency gains to be reaped from state- 
of-the-art project management techniques. In cooperation with Carnegie 
Mellon University, the company's four software development divisions 
(in Shenzhen, Bangalore, Shanghai, and Nanjing) have all been awarded 
CMMS certificates, the highest level of software project management 
certification. 
As for quality control and production flow management, Huawei has 
heavily relied on Germany's Fraunhofer Gesellschaft, including integrated I 
production line layout and warehouse automation, thus reducing material 
movement, shortening the production cycle, and improving production 
efficiency and quality. Global consulting firms (especially KPMG and 
IBM) have also played an important role in developing key elements for 
implementing Huawei's move from an equipment supplier to a provider 
of integrated solutions. Most importantly, Huawei has spent substantial 
efforts in upgrading its human resource management practices in cooper- 
ation with global consulting firms, such as Hay and Mercer. These actions 
helped the company to improve staff recruitment and development. One 
positive indicator is that Huawei has been ranked as number five in the 
July 2005 list of "Best Chinese Students Employer Award," published by 
ChinaHR.~om.~ 
Like other Chinese IT companies, Huawei's initial key competitive 
advantage was the low cost of its researchers and engineers. Out of its 
worldwide workforce of about 30,000, over 14,500 (48 percent) work in 
R&D. More than 6,000 of this R&D workforce are specializing in 3G and 
related technologies. Most of the R&D personnel are now based in China, 
where salaries typically are one third to one fifth of US salaries (Emst 
2007). The low cost of R&D personnel explains how Huawei can develop 
tailor-made solutions that address the specific needs of network operators 
with tight budgets. 
As in other East Asian exporting countries, demographic trends in China 
will over the longer-term, slow the growth of the working-age population, 
creating pressures for wage increases. One of the by-products of the one- 
child policy in China is that labor force growth will slow dramatically after 
2015. Indeed, this is one of the biggest differences between China and India: 
India is one of the few countries with significant technological capabilities i 
in which the working-age population is poised to grow for the next forty 
years, keeping wages low. 
It will take time before the current huge wage cost differentials between 
China and industrialized countries will be reduced, but the erosion 1 
of labor cost advantages is already a reality for highly skilled labor in I 
the IT industry. In both China and India, IT firms complain about a I 
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Table 3.2 Huawei's global innovation network 
KristalStockholm, Sweden Base station architecture and 
system design; analog-mixed 
signal design (RF); algorithms 
Moscow, Russia Algorithms; RF design 
Bangalore, India Development of embedded SW and 
platforms 
Plano, Texas (Dallas Total solutions for CDMA; G3 
Telecom Corridor) UMTS, CDMA Mobile Intelligent 
Networks; mobile data service; 
optical; voice over Internet 
protocol 
Source: 8 Dieter Emst. 
severe shortage of experienced engineers and managers, which is driving 
salaries up and creating a "war for talent" (Ernst 2006a). As jobs become 
more senior and require greater expertise and experience, pay increases 
cost proportionately much more in China than in the US. Thus, while 
China's supply of current engineering graduates exceeds that of any other 
country, there is a shortage of experienced and highly qualified engineers 
and scientists. 
To overcome this critical shortage of senior and experienced engineers 
and managers, Huawei has pursued a two-pronged strategy: it is building a 
variety of linkages and alliances with leading global industry players and 
universities, while concurrently establishing its own global innovation net- 
work. Huawei has thus developed a web of project-specific collaboration 
arrangements with major suppliers of core components, such as Siemens (as 
part of China's TD-SCDMA project), 3Com (with a focus on sales and joint 
product development), as well as Intel and Qualcomm. Huawei's emerging 
global innovation network now includes, in addition to six R&D centers in 
China, four major overseas R&D centers (see Table 3.2). 
In sum, Huawei displays all the characteristics of a company that is 
building impressive and genuine technological capabilities. There is no guar- 
antee that Huawei will continue to grow, nor can we predict how many f m s  
like Huawei will ultimately emerge in China. However, this particular case 
study supports the general picture of openness, flexibility, and technological 
dynamism which we painted in more general terms in earlier sections. 
Conclusion 
This chapter presents an optimistic picture of China's industrial develop- 
ment, as seen through the perspective of the IT industry. Both Chinese 
domestic factors and international economic trends have contributed to 
the rapid restructuring of the Chinese IT industry into a highly dynamic, 
56 Dieter Ernst and Barry Naughton 
flexible, and open structure. The diversity of Chinese industry is its great 
strength. Equally important are flexibility and international openness that 
have enabled Chinese IT firms to take advantage of the new opportunities 
that result from transformations in global production and innovation net- 
works. This has enabled Chinese IT firms to accelerate the development of 
management and innovation capabilities. 
In this context, we should not overestimate the state's role in Chinese 
industry. Although government policies are pervasive and specific interven- 
tions common, the most important activity with respect to the IT industry 
is not in the government sector at all, but in the second-tier hybrid sector. 
State ownership is significant in industry overall, and is likely to remain so 
for the foreseeable future. But state ownership is increasingly circumscribed 
in areas where it is probably not terribly costly economically, and may even 
have some justification in providing public goods and social services. The 
most dynamic sectors are evolving in different directions. 
China is developing a multi-centric economy with great local diversity. In 
a broad sense, we are seeing a shift in the locus of technological dynamism 
beyond Beijing, and toward the Yangtze Delta (especially), as well as the 
Pearl River Delta. In the recent wave of technological dynamism, Beijing's 
Zhongguancun has displayed nowhere near the creativity, or dominance, 
that it displayed in the earlier, 1990s wave. New centers of semiconductor 
production and design, software, and new web-based services are growing 
up outside of Beijing. 
In a related fashion, the rapid emergence of industrial clusters, composed 
primarily of small firms, is reshaping the distribution of both traditional 
and high-tech industries. This seems to represent the reemergence of a 
pattern with deep roots in Chinese history and culture. There are many 
precedents in China for dense networks of competing and cooperating 
small firms. As this pattern deepens, we expect to see increasing differences 
in the composition of output across different geographical regions. 
We may speculate that this pattern has long-run political implica- 
tions as well, and may influence the political evolution of China. Firms 
at both the central and regional levels continue to be characterized by 
close government-business ties, hybrid ownership, and insider dealing. 
This characteristic will combine with patterns of regional differentiation 
to create regional interest groups. It is not far-fetched to expect that 
region-based interest groups will create the first patterns of open political 
competition in China. Indeed, perhaps this is already happening, as Beijing 
politicians seek alliances in the Northeast and West to offset the growing 
economic clout of the Southeastern provinces. 
Our most important conclusion concerns the IT industry itself. Close 
examination of that industry reveals patterns of organizational and stra- 
tegic behavior that are likely to  foster robust development. Moreover, this is 
coming at a particular stage in the process of globalization that is enabling 
new kinds of cross-border cooperation at a deeper level, extending beyond 
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production to design, development, and research. A11 these activities have 
economic implications: there is a great deal of successful development 
of capabilities and transfer of technology as part of these international 
networks of cooperation and competition. As a result, we expect the IT 
industry to  continue to  thrive and provide a powerful impetus to the 
continuing of China's capitalist transition. 
Notes 
1 Overall, at least 15 other firms in the SASAC portfolio come from the military 
industrial complex. 
2 This section draws on a detailed case study in Ernst (2006c). 
3 These include Alcatel and Lucent for telecom equipment, and Cisw and Juniper 
for enterprise networking equipment. 
4 The survey was wnducted among 27,000 recent graduates of 600 Chinese univer- 
sities. The 2005 ranking is Haier, IBM, P&G, Lenovo, Huawei, China Mobile, 
Microsoft, Siemens, LG, and GE. 
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